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POLICY FORMULATION VERSUS POLICY 
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MAGNUSON-STEVENS FISHERY 
CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT ACT: 
INSIGHT FROM THE NORTH PACIFIC 
CRAB RATIONALIZATION 
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Monica Roth & Ritchie Eppink* 
Abstract: The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Manage-
ment Act (MSA) governs management of fisheries located three to 200 
miles off the coast of the United States. The MSA is unique in adminis-
trative law in that it devolves policy formulation to eight Regional Fish-
ery Management Councils rather than to a federal agency. That agency, 
the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), is relegated primarily to 
developing regulations that implement the councils’ policies. NMFS can 
review the councils’ policies only to ensure that they are consistent with 
existing laws. NMFS has no authority to revise policy to suit its own pref-
erences, or to write regulations that undercut council policy intent, ex-
cept when conflicts with other applicable laws arise. The MSA’s legisla-
tive history reveals NMFS routinely undercuts this special administrative 
process through the regulations it writes. We review a recent example in 
which NMFS attempted to undermine the North Pacific Fishery Man-
agement Council’s crab rationalization policy through the regulation-
writing process. We offer a simple solution to help avoid future abuse of 
administrative authority. This solution may have utility in other areas of 
administrative law in which authority to formulate policy is separated 
from the power to implement it. 
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Introduction 
 The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act 
(MSA)1 governs management of fisheries2 within the Exclusive Eco-
nomic Zone (EEZ) of the United States, which includes waters three to 
200 miles off the nation’s coasts.3 The centerpiece of the MSA’s fishery 
management framework is devolution of fishery policy to local stake-
holders and experts—those most familiar with the unique circumstances 
and needs of local and regional fisheries—through the establishment of 
eight Regional Fishery Management Councils.4 The councils, which are 
required to seek broad public input from individuals with local knowl-
edge and interest in the fisheries,5 are unique in the federal regulatory 
system.6 
 The MSA grants the councils enormous authority over federal 
fisheries management, bestowing on them the primary responsibility 
for developing and amending fishery management plans (FMPs) for 
each fishery in the council’s jurisdiction that requires management.7 In 
addition, the MSA grants councils the authority to propose regulations 
to implement each FMP.8 Under the MSA management framework, an 
FMP and the regulations that implement it go hand-in-hand.9 The FMP 
serves as a foundational policy document, setting out the basic policies 
that will govern the fishery,10 while the implementing regulations give 
the force of law to those policies.11 
 Although the MSA does not grant the councils authority to actually 
promulgate regulations, it contemplates only limited agency review of 
                                                                                                                      
1 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1883 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004). The MSA was reauthorized in legis-
lation enacted in January 2007. Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management 
Reauthorization Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-479, 120 Stat. 3575 (2007). 
2 Id. § 1802(13)(A). A “fishery” under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation 
and Management Act (MSA) is a stock of fish that is treated as a unit, based on geographi-
cal, scientific, technical, recreational, and economic characteristics. Id. 
3 Id. §§ 1802(11), 1811(a); Proclamation No. 5030, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,605 (Mar. 10, 1983). 
4 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801(b)(5), 1852(a). 
5 See id. § 1852(h)(3). 
6 H.R. Rep. No. 104-171, at 45 (1995). The Department of Justice (DOJ), in a 1995 let-
ter to the House Resources Committee, described the councils as “unique creations within 
the federal government [that] present very difficult constitutional questions regarding 
their structure and functions.” Id. 
7 16 U.S.C. § 1852(h)(1). 
8 Id. §§ 1853(c), 1854(b). 
9 See id. § 1854(b). 
10 William R. Rogalski, The Unique Federalism of the Regional Councils Under the Fishery 
Conservation and Management Act of 1976, 9 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 163, 171 & n.44, 172 
(1980). 
11 See 16 U.S.C. § 1854(b); Rogalski, supra note 10, at 166 n.14. 
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the policy determinations, FMPs, FMP amendments, and proposed 
regulations developed by the councils.12 The U.S. Secretary of Com-
merce, who has delegated his review authority under the MSA to the 
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS)13—a division of the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration—ultimately promulgates 
management measures and regulations. NMFS’s review is limited by 
statute to ensuring that each FMP, FMP amendment, and proposed 
regulation is consistent with the MSA and other applicable laws.14 
NMFS has no authority to revise a council-submitted FMP, amendment, 
or proposed regulation to suit its own policy preferences, or to write 
regulations that undercut council policy intent, except when they con-
flict with other applicable laws.15 Nevertheless, NMFS has demonstrated 
either a misunderstanding of this special administrative process, or has 
attempted to seize traditional, lead-agency federal regulatory powers 
not accorded it under the MSA.16 The MSA’s legislative history reveals 
several attempts by Congress to address NMFS’s usurpation of council 
authority.17 None of Congress’s efforts has eliminated the problem.18 
 The tendency of NMFS to overstep its authority was made abun-
dantly clear when it recently failed to follow council policy decisions, 
even when explicitly directed by Congress to adopt a particular council-
                                                                                                                      
12 See 16 U.S.C. § 1854(b). 
13 See id. §§ 1802(34), 1854(a), (b); Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., Dep’t of Commerce, 
Operational Guidelines: Fishery Management Plan Process A-61 (1997), available at 
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/domes_fish/guidelines.pdf [hereinafter FMP Guidelines]. 
14 See 16 U.S.C. § 1854(a), (b). The National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) may 
make “technical changes as may be necessary for clarity” to proposed regulations submit-
ted by a council, but must publish in the Federal Register an explanation of any changes 
made. Id. § 1854(b)(1)(A). 
15 See id. § 1854. In practice, the fishery management plan (FMP) and proposed regu-
lation process is decoupled. Telephone Interview with Chris Oliver, Executive Dir., N. Pac. 
Fishery Mgmt. Council (Aug. 11, 2006) [hereinafter Interview with Oliver]. Councils typi-
cally defer the proposed regulation writing to NMFS. Id. Limited council budgets and staff-
ing, and the fact that NMFS ultimately must enforce the regulations, underpins this con-
vention. Id. 
16 See Oceana, Inc. v. Evans, No. 04-0811, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3959, at *92 (D.D.C. 
Mar. 9, 2005); Associated Fisheries of Me., Inc. v. Evans, 350 F. Supp. 2d 247, 253 (D. Me. 
2004). 
17 See H.R. Rep No. 97-549, at 8–9, 28 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4320, 
4322, 4341; H.R. Rep No. 97-438, at 8 (1982). 
18 See Oceana, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3959, at *92 (“In light of the Secretary’s improper 
substitution of his own recommendation in place of the Council’s, the Court is constrained 
to hold that the [provision] was adopted in violation of the MSA and therefore cannot be 
enforced.”); Associated Fisheries, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 253 (“The Court is troubled by the Gov-
ernment’s clear and inexplicable failure to comply with the procedural requirements of 
. . . the Magnuson-Stevens Act . . . .”). 
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approved management program.19 Following unanimous approval20 of 
a Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands (BSAI) crab rationalization21 pro-
gram by the North Pacific Fishery Management Council (North Pacific 
Council)22—which, among other elements, envisioned the use of both 
Fishermen’s Collective Marketing Act (FCMA)23 and non-FCMA coop-
eratives—Congress and the President enacted a January 2004 appro-
priations rider instructing the Secretary of Commerce to implement 
“all parts of the Program.”24 Ten months later, NMFS issued a proposed 
rule that deviated from the policy embodied in the program that the 
North Pacific Council had approved and that Congress had directed 
NMFS to implement.25 Only after a nearly unprecedented, thorough 
review and comment by the North Pacific Council and stakeholders in 
the fishery, and ultimately a letter to NMFS from Senator Ted Stevens, 
did the agency correct the rule to conform to the council motion.26 
 This Article uses the BSAI crab rationalization program to exam-
ine NMFS’s apparent confusion over the MSA’s subtle, but clear, dis-
tinction between policy formulation (which lies with the councils) and 
policy implementation (which lies with the Secretary, acting through 
                                                                                                                      
19 See 15 U.S.C. § 521 (2000); 16 U.S.C. §§ 1852(a)(1)(G), 1862(j)(1), (2) (Supp. IV 
2004). 
20 N. Pac. Fishery Mgmt. Council, 157th Plenary Session Minutes 38 ( June 2, 
2002), available at http://www.fakr.noaa.gov/npfmc/minutes/Council602.pdf. 
21 “Rationalization” is a term used to describe many different dedicated access man-
agement approaches to fishery management, but primarily refers to market-based pro-
grams involving individual transferable quotas or fishery cooperatives. See Shellfish Fisher-
ies of the Exclusive Economic Zone Off Alaska, 69 Fed. Reg. 63,260, 63,262 (Oct. 29, 2004) 
(to be codified at 50 C.F.R. § 680.2). 
22 The North Pacific Council has authority over fisheries in the Bering Sea, the Pacific 
Ocean seaward of Alaska, and the Arctic Ocean. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(a)(1)(G). 
23 15 U.S.C. § 521. The Fisherman’s Collective Marketing Act (FCMA) grants a limited 
antitrust exemption to fishing industry cooperatives that meet certain requirements. See id. 
24 16 U.S.C. § 1862(j)(1), (2). 
25 See Fisheries of the Exclusive Economic Zone Off Alaska; Allocating Bering Sea and 
Aleutian Islands King and Tanner Crab Fishery Resources, 69 Fed. Reg. 63,199, 63,200 (pro-
posed Oct. 29, 2004) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pts. 679, 680); N. Pacific Fishery Mgmt. 
Council, Draft Council Motion for BSAI Crab Rationalization, in Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 
Dep’t of Commerce, Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Bering Sea Aleu-
tian Islands King and Tanner Crab Fisheries app. 4-1, at 1 (2004), available at http:// 
 www.fakr.noaa.gov/sustainablefisheries/crab/eis/final/Appendix1_1.pdf [hereinafter Council 
Motion]; Letter from Stephanie Madsen, Council Chair, N. Pac. Fisheries Mgmt. Council, to 
Sue Salveson, Assistant Reg’l Adm’r, Alaska Region NMFS (Dec. 2004) (on file with author), 
available at http://www.fakr.noaa.gov/npfmc/current_issues/crab/crabcomments1204.pdf 
[hereinafter Madsen Letter]. 
26 See Letter from Ted Stevens, Senator, to Conrad Lautenbacher, Adm’r, Nat’l Oceanic & 
Atmospheric Admin. (Dec. 13, 2004) (on file with author) [hereinafter Letter from Stevens]. 
See generally Madsen Letter, supra note 25. 
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NMFS). The result is a council-agency relationship that frustrates the 
Act’s philosophy of devolving policy formation to local stakeholders 
and experts familiar with unique fishery circumstances.27 Following an 
overview of some of the major differences between NMFS’s proposed 
rule and the North Pacific Council’s motion, we speculate about 
whether the deviation between the motion and the proposed rule was 
inadvertent, or the result of confusion about whether NMFS’s respon-
sibility is only to implement policy or also extends to reformulating pol-
icy established by regional councils.28 We conclude that regardless of 
the reason(s), legislative adjustments—possibly through MSA reau-
thorization—should confront this issue squarely, with the ancillary 
benefit of lessening the risk of subsequent litigation. 
 Part I of this Article reviews the legislative history of the council-
NMFS relationship under the MSA, focusing on the procedures for 
NMFS’s review of FMPs, FMP amendments, and implementing regula-
tions.29 Part II juxtaposes the North Pacific Council’s BSAI crab ration-
alization motion with NMFS’s proposed rule, first setting out the major 
elements and policy intent of the motion and then highlighting four 
major points of deviation between the twenty-six page motion and the 
398-page, double-spaced proposed rule.30 Part III discusses NMFS’s un-
willingness to heed the councils’ policymaking authority. Finally, the 
Recommendation and Conclusion section proposes legislative additions 
to improve congruence of policy and regulation under the MSA re-
gional council system.31 The proposal can be used in other administra-
tive law regimes that separate the power to formulate policy from the 
power to implement it. 
I. The Council-NMFS Relationship 
 Congress has maintained an abiding confidence in the regional 
council management scheme for our nation’s federal fisheries, begin-
ning with the passage of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation 
and Management Act (MSA) in 1976 and continuing throughout the 
past thirty years.32 The original act unilaterally and instantaneously de-
clared federal management authority over a zone running from three 
                                                                                                                      
27 See 16 U.S.C. 1852(h)(3). 
28 See discussion infra Part II.C. 
29 See discussion infra Part I.B. 
30 See discussion infra Part II. 
31 See discussion infra Recommendation and Conclusion. 
32 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1883; Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, § 101, 
90 Stat. 331, 336 (1976) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1811(a)). 
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miles offshore to 200 miles offshore,33 leaving the nation with over two 
million square miles of fisheries to manage.34 In 1976, Congress faced 
the problem of comprehensively managing this vast new fisheries juris-
diction, and sought to enlist federal resources while simultaneously 
gaining the cooperation of fishermen, consumers, and members of the 
general public—all groups more sensitive to local issues than a federal 
agency based in Washington, D.C.35 Congress’s solution was the re-
gional fishery management councils,36 an attempt “to balance the na-
tional perspective with that of the individual States,” determined to be 
“the best hope we can have of obtaining fishery management decisions 
which in fact protect the fish and which, at the same time, have the 
support of the fishermen who are regulated.”37 
A. The Current Relationship 
 The current relationship between the councils and the National 
Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), in place since 1996,38 is the product 
of twenty years of congressional tinkering, and both unmistakably and 
tightly limits the scope of NMFS’s review of council determinations.39 
Under the MSA, policy to govern a particular fishery can be made or 
changed in only three ways: (1) the issuance or amendment of a fishery 
management plan (FMP) for the fishery;40 (2) promulgation of regula-
tions to implement a new FMP or FMP amendment;41 or (3) amendment 
of existing regulations governing a fishery without a corresponding 
change in the FMP.42 In each case, the current MSA process contemplates 
                                                                                                                      
33 Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 § 101, 90 Stat. at 336. 
34 Office of Tech. Assessment, 95th Cong., Establishing a 200-Mile Fisheries 
Zone 24 (1977). 
35 Federal Fisheries Management: A Guidebook to the Magnuson Fishery Con-
servation and Management Act 43 ( Jon Jacobson et al. eds., rev. ed. 1985). 
36 Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-265, § 302, 90 
Stat. 347–51 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1852). 
37 Senate Debates and Passage of H.R. 200, 122 Cong. Rec. 114, 115 (1976) (statement 
of Sen. Magnuson), reprinted in Staff of S. Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong., A Legis-
lative History of the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, at 455 
(Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter Legislative History]. 
38 Sustainable Fisheries Act, Pub. L. No. 104-297, §§ 108–110, 110 Stat. 3559, 3574–
3592 (1996). Congress has made no major changes to the FMP and regulatory review 
process since 1996, when it overhauled the process. See id. 
39 See id. 
40 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1852(h)(1), 1853(c) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004). 
41 See id. § 1853(d)(5). 
42 See id. § 1852(h)(5). 
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that the initiator and formulator of policy change should be a regional 
council.43 
1. FMPs and FMP Amendments 
 FMPs and FMP amendments, which set the foundations for policy 
in a particular fishery, are the core function of the regional councils.44 
Councils submit FMPs and FMP amendments to NMFS, which must 
immediately begin reviewing the FMP or amendment, provide a sixty-
day public comment period, and then approve, disapprove, or partially 
approve the FMP or amendment within thirty days of the end of the 
comment period.45 NMFS must fully approve an FMP or amendment, 
unless it discovers a clear inconsistency with the MSA or other applica-
ble law.46 If it extends less than full approval, it must allow the submit-
ting council to try again with a revised FMP or amendment, after giving 
the council a detailed “notice of disapproval” specifying the inconsis-
tencies, and recommending actions that the council could take to gain 
approval.47 Moreover, NMFS has no “pocket veto” —if it does not validly 
act on an FMP or amendment within thirty days of the end of the 
comment period, the FMP or amendment will take effect as if NMFS 
had approved it.48 
 Except in an emergency, NMFS may prepare its own plan only if 
the relevant council fails to develop a needed FMP or amendment 
within a reasonable time.49 If NMFS does so, it must hold local public 
hearings50 and submit its proposed FMP or amendment to the public 
and the relevant council for a sixty-day comment period.51 Further-
more, NMFS cannot repeal or revoke an FMP without three-quarters 
majority approval from the relevant council.52 
                                                                                                                      
43 See id. §§ 1852(h), 1853(d). 
44 Id. § 1852(h)(1). 
45 Id. § 1854(a). 
46 16 U.S.C. § 1854(a)(1)(A); see H. Rep. No. 97-549, at 28 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4320, 4341 (“The Secretary can disapprove a plan only if it is found to be in 
clear violation of the national standards or a clear violation of law.”). 
47 16 U.S.C. § 1854(a)(3), (4). 
48 Id. § 1854(a)(3). 
49 Id. § 1854(c)(1)(A), (B); see id. § 1855(c). NMFS may also prepare its own plan with 
respect to certain fisheries over which Congress has given the Secretary of Commerce pri-
mary authority. Id. § 1854(c)(1)(C); see id. § 1854(g). 
50 Id. § 1854(c)(2)(A). 
51 Id. § 1854(c)(4). Furthermore, NMFS cannot include any limited access system in 
an FMP or FMP amendment it prepares itself unless it obtains majority approval from the 
appropriate council. Id. § 1854(c)(3). 
52 Id. § 1854(h). 
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 As a practical matter, however, the FMP and FMP amendment proc-
ess has become a closely collaborative one, involving both the council 
and NMFS throughout preparation and review.53 Conceivably, NMFS 
could exploit this cooperation to influence council policy decisions. But 
the more likely area where NMFS might influence policy is in the devel-
opment of implementing regulations. NMFS has greater familiarity with 
the regulatory process, in part because it assumes subsequent enforce-
ment responsibility; it also has a much larger staff, including members of 
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s General Coun-
sel Office, and it controls the budgets of regional fishery management 
councils.54 
2. Implementing Regulations and Regulatory Amendments 
 Whenever a council submits an FMP or FMP amendment to NMFS, 
the council must simultaneously submit proposed regulations to imple-
ment the FMP or amendment.55 In practice, the regulations are drafted 
by NMFS and submitted by the council as part of the package.56 Also, if 
a council determines that an existing regulation requires amendment 
without a corresponding change in the underlying FMP, the council can 
submit a standalone regulatory amendment to NMFS, or ask NMFS to 
prepare the regulatory amendment and submit that to NMFS.57 In ei-
ther case, the scope of NMFS’s review (or drafting of the proposed regu-
lation) is strictly limited, just as with FMPs and FMP amendments.58 
Upon submission by the council, NMFS must immediately begin evalu-
ating the proposed regulation or regulatory amendment and must ap-
prove it within fifteen days unless it is inconsistent with the underlying 
FMP, the MSA, or other applicable law.59 If NMFS disapproves the regu-
lation or amendment as inconsistent with applicable law, NMFS must 
provide a notice specifying the inconsistencies, recommending revisions, 
                                                                                                                      
53 See FMP Guidelines, supra note 13, at A-22 (“Close cooperation between the Councils 
and NMFS during [FMP preparation] is essential to reduce the risk of disapproval or partial 
approval during [the formal review phase].”); see also Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., Dep’t 
of Commerce, Draft Operational Guidelines for the Development and Implementa-
tion of Fishery Management Actions 6 (2005), available at http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/ 
sfa/domes_fish/OperationalGuidelines/DraftOGs_082405.pdf; Rogalski, supra note 10, at 
178 n.82 (“[NMFS] participates in this process throughout . . . .”). 
54 See NOAA Fisheries Service, http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2007). 
55 16 U.S.C. § 1853(c)(1). 
56 Interview with Oliver, supra note 15. 
57 16 U.S.C. § 1853(c)(2). 
58 H.R. Rep. No. 97-438, at 8 (1992). 
59 16 U.S.C. § 1854(b)(1). 
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and giving the submitting council an opportunity to resubmit.60 If 
NMFS approves the submission, it must publish the proposed regula-
tion or amendment for a fifteen- to sixty-day public comment period.61 
NMFS may not make any substantive changes to the council’s submis-
sion without council approval.62 Before publication of the proposed 
regulation or amendment for public comment, NMFS may not change 
the council’s proposed regulation or amendment except to make “tech-
nical changes as may be necessary for clarity.”63 Even subsequent to the 
public comment period, NMFS may make changes to the council’s 
submission only after consulting with the council.64 In both cases, 
NMFS must publish an explanation of the changes.65 
 The councils seem to be due great deference in proposing federal 
rules; one court noted that NMFS’s review “is not de novo . . . but analo-
gous to an ‘abuse of discretion’ or ‘clear error’ standard.”66 In practice, 
however, nearly all regulations and regulatory amendments are drafted 
by NMFS after the council formulates the policy.67 The councils simply 
do not have enough staff to adequately prepare federal regulations.68 
Since 2001, NMFS has exercised its budgetary control over councils to 
require that councils notify NMFS before seeking legal advice, and to 
prohibit them from retaining continuing counsel.69 In addition, NMFS 
has argued with mixed success that loopholes in the MSA allow NMFS 
to make and modify fishery management rules on its own, out of whole 
cloth and without council involvement.70 
                                                                                                                      
60 Id. § 1854(b)(1)(B), (2). 
61 Id. § 1854(b)(1)(A). 
62 Id. § 1854(b)(3). 
63 Id. § 1854(b)(1)(A). 
64 Id. § 1854(b)(3). 
65 16 U.S.C. § 1854(b)(1)(A), (3). 
66 J.H. Miles & Co. v. Brown, 910 F. Supp. 1138, 1159 (E.D. Va. 1995). 
67 Interview with Oliver, supra note 15. One exception is the Gulf of Mexico Fishery 
Management Council, which contracts for regulation drafting with a former NMFS staff 
member. Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Regional Fisheries Management Council’s Employment Practices, 50 C.F.R. § 600.120(g) 
(2005); see Magnuson-Stevens Act Provisions, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,885, 57,887 (Nov. 19, 2001). 
70 In Oceana, Inc. v. Evans, for instance, the Secretary of Commerce relied on 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1855(d)—which authorizes him to “promulgate such regulations . . . as may be neces-
sary” to carry out FMPs and FMP amendments—to justify a substantive addition NMFS 
made to a council-submitted proposed regulation. No. 04-0811, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
3959, at *87–89 (D.D.C. Mar. 9, 2005). The court rejected the Secretary’s argument, saying 
that the MSA “is clear that when the Secretary is presented with proposed amendments 
and regulations, he does not have the independent authority to, sua sponte, add a regula-
tion that is inconsistent with the proposal from the Council.” Id. at *89. (quoting Con-
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 Any significant influence that NMFS might obtain over councils’ 
decisions is contrary to the intent of the MSA to devolve federal fisher-
ies policymaking to regional experts.71 The legislative history of the 
FMP and regulation review process only reinforces this conclusion, as it 
reveals a series of efforts by Congress to tighten and close loopholes in 
the original MSA that have allowed NMFS to circumvent council poli-
cymaking.72 
B. Legislative History of the Relationship 
 From the MSA’s outset, Congress has made it clear that the coun-
cils were to be independent, and function as the policymakers in fed-
eral fisheries management. Senator Warren Magnuson, a sponsor of 
the original MSA in the Senate, described the councils as unique and 
“relatively independent” institutions whose “powers are derived from 
the constitutional authority of the federal government, yet . . . are self-
determinant in their own affairs.”73 And although the 1976 act gave 
NMFS—as the delegate of the Secretary of Commerce74—the ability to 
approve or disapprove any council FMP,75 prepare its own FMP when 
councils failed to prepare their own,76 and promulgate its own regula-
tions to implement plans,77 nothing in the legislative record suggests 
that Congress intended NMFS to use that power to infect the councils’ 
                                                                                                                      
necticut v. Daley, 53 F. Supp. 2d 147, 160–61 (D. Conn. 1999), aff’d, 204 F.2d 413 (2d Cir. 
2000)). 
In another case, the Secretary argued for authority to “clarify” what he characterized 
as a “clerical error” in a council’s proposed regulation. Associated Fisheries of Me., Inc. v. 
Evans, 350 F. Supp. 2d 247, 251–52 (D. Me. 2004). The court noted that the MSA “gives 
the Secretary certain powers that allow him to influence policy,” but emphasized that “he 
is generally obliged to implement and enforce the management plans and amendments 
designed by the regional councils.” Id. at 253. It went on to reject the Secretary’s “clarifica-
tion” argument, saying that “the [MSA’s] statutory scheme, taken as a whole, strongly sug-
gests that while Congress wished the Secretary to have the power to prod the Council to 
remedy mistakes or address issues, it generally left the power to craft solutions to the 
Council itself.” Id. On the other hand, NMFS and the Secretary have had greater success in 
relying on the MSA’s emergency regulation provisions. See Parravano v. Babbitt, 70 F.3d 
539, 544–46 (9th Cir. 1995). 
71 See infra Part I.B. 
72 See infra Part I.B. 
73 Warren G. Magnuson, The Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976: First Step 
Toward Improved Management of Marine Fisheries, 52 Wash. L. Rev. 427, 436 (1976). 
74 See FMP Guidelines, supra note 13, at A-61. 
75 Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-265, § 304(a), 90 
Stat. 331, 352 (1976). 
76 Id. § 304(c), 90 Stat. at 353. 
77 Id. § 305(a), 90 Stat. at 354. 
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policymaking with its own agenda. First, as to whether the FMPs or the 
implementing regulations were to be the principal policy document for 
fisheries management, the conference committee made it clear: “[T]he 
fishery management plan is the comprehensive statement of how the 
fishery is to be managed . . . . ‘Regulations’, as used in this Act, means 
the regulations promulgated to implement what is contained in the 
fishery management plan.”78 And the House Merchant Marine and 
Fisheries Committee, once “mak[ing] it clear” in its report on the MSA 
legislation “that the final decision as to . . . whether [an FMP] will enter 
into force and effect rests with the Secretary,” went on to declare its ex-
pectation “that, in most cases, after a plan has been thoroughly consid-
ered by a Council and there appears to be justification for such a plan, 
the Secretary will adopt the plan.”79 Echoing the House committee’s 
view, Senator Magnuson, Commerce Committee chair, reported on the 
Senate floor that the committee “feel[s] that use of the veto by the Sec-
retary of Commerce would be rare and that for the most part, primary 
management decisions would be lodged in the regional councils.”80 A 
Senate colloquy later that day made it clear that the legislation’s pro-
ponents intended the council’s will to be circumvented only in emer-
gency cases.81 
                                                                                                                      
78 S. Rep. No. 94-711, at 54 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 660, 678, and in Leg-
islative History, supra note 37, at 90; see also H. Rep. No. 94-445, at 67 (1975), as reprinted in 
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 593, 635, and in Legislative History, supra note 37, at 1051, 1120 (“The 
Committee would like to encourage to the maximum extent possible Council participation 
in the development of proposed regulations which involve a fishery with which it is con-
cerned.”). 
79 H. Rep. No. 94-445, at 68 (1975), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 593, 636, and in 
Legislative History, supra note 37, at 1051, 1121; see also id. at 61 (“[T]he Committee ex-
pects the Councils, to the maximum extent possible, to be utilized by the Secretary.”). 
80 122 Cong. Rec. 114, 115 (1976) (statement of Sen. Magnuson), reprinted in Legis-
lative History, supra note 37, at 455. The sentiment was the same on the House floor, 
where Representative Robert Leggett reported for the House Committee on Merchant 
Marine and Fisheries: 
[B]efore exercising [the] veto authority or drawing up a management plan, on 
his own initiative, the committee intends for the Secretary of Commerce to 
make every effort to see that whenever possible the views of the States or the 
Councils are honored. It is only in these unusual situations, where the fishery 
concerned would be substantially and adversely affected, that the Secretary 
would not honor such views or recommendations. 
121 Cong. Rec. 32,532, 32,541 (1976), reprinted in Legislative History, supra note 37, at 
846. 
81 Senator Mike Gravel queried Senator Ted Stevens: “Can the Secretary disregard all 
other actions of the council or should we pass a technical amendment here that would re-
quire any decision made by the Secretary to first receive approval of the council?” Stevens 
replied: “Normally, if the Secretary does not agree he must send it back. But in an emergency 
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 Yet, before the 1970s were over, Congress was hearing testimony 
that NMFS was routinely circumventing the will of the councils.82 The 
executive director of the Mid-Atlantic Council testified, succinctly, that 
“[i]t seems the result of every plan we send through is either a change 
[in] the policy, clarification of policy, or a new policy is established.”83 
This and similar comments from the councils and stakeholders 
prompted congressional reports strongly emphasizing the councils’ in-
dependence and NMFS’s limited role in formulating fishery manage-
ment policy,84 which culminated in the 1983 enactment of amendments 
overhauling the MSA FMP review process.85 This rewrite of the council-
NMFS relationship aggressively protected the councils’ policymaking 
authority by: (1) requiring NMFS to “immediately” commence review 
of all council-submitted FMPs;86 (2) requiring NMFS to provide a spe-
cific explanation of all problems with any FMP it rejected;87 (3) provid-
ing for automatic approval of an FMP if NMFS did not approve or dis-
approve it within certain short deadlines;88 (4) giving councils a longer 
                                                                                                                      
there is an opportunity for the Secretary to promulgate ad hoc, temporary short-term type 
regulations.” 122 Cong. Rec. 114, 129 (1976), reprinted in Legislative History, supra note 
37, at 494. 
82 See Fishery Conservation and Management Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries 
and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment of the H. Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisher-
ies, 96th Cong. 1 (1979). 
83 Id. at 589 (statement of John Bryson, Executive Director, Mid-Atlantic Regional 
Fishery Management Council); see also id. at 238 (statement of Richard N. Sharood, Na-
tional Federation of Fishermen) (testifying that “there has been a lot of backdoor rejec-
tion of plans as when the Fishery Service will tell the council members off the record, do 
not submit that plan” and that “[v]irtually nothing is done by the Fishery Service today to 
implement a management plan that is not done on an alleged emergency basis”), 592–93 
(statement of Clement Tillion, Chairman, North Pacific Regional Fishery Management 
Council) (“Our biggest problem is some of the nitpicking by NMFS . . . . We have very little 
difficulty conforming to the [MSA], but not necessarily to the wishes of NMFS.”). 
84 See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 97-438, at 9 (1982) (“The fact that the Secretary would have 
reached a different conclusion on how to manage a fishery does not justify the Secretary 
in substituting his judgment for that of the Council and disapproving the plan. The Coun-
cils, not the Secretary, are to manage fisheries within their respective areas.”). In a later 
report, the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee stated that it was responding 
to “concern that the federal review of management decisions taken by the Councils too 
often resulted in undesirable alterations to those decisions” and “re-emphasized that the 
Secretary is not to substitute his judgment for that of the Councils regarding how to man-
age a fishery. The Secretary can disapprove a plan only if it is found to be in clear violation 
of the national standards or a clear violation of law.” H.R. Rep. No. 97-549, at 9, 28 (1982), 
as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4320, 4322, 4341. 
85 Pub. L. No. 97-453, § 7, 96 Stat. 2481 (1983). 
86 Id. § 7(a)(1), 96 Stat. at 2487. 
87 Id. § 7(a)(1)(C)(2), 96 Stat. at 2488. 
88 Id. at § 7(b)(1)(A), 96 Stat. at 2489. 
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time to review FMPs that NMFS prepared on its own;89 (5) requiring 
NMFS to publish an explanation of any substantive changes to imple-
menting regulations proposed by councils;90 and (6) granting each 
council authority to require NMFS to adopt emergency management 
regulations.91 These provisions were enacted despite specific and gen-
eral objections from the Department of Commerce.92 Coupled with 
three more minor changes enacted in 1986,93 they show that Congress’s 
confidence in the regional council strategy persisted well into the 1980s 
and provide a strong indication of congressional intent on the balance 
of policymaking power between the councils and NMFS. 
 After 1983, Congress made no significant changes to the MSA 
council-NMFS relationship until reauthorization in 1996.94 By that time, 
however, the legislative record manifested a growing concern over 
whether the regional councils were representing the broad public inter-
est.95 Congress responded to the concern with amendments to improve 
                                                                                                                      
89 Id. § 7(a)(2)(B), 96 Stat. at 2489. 
90 Id. § 7(a)(1), 96 Stat. at 2487. 
91 Pub. L. No. 97-453, § 8(3), 96 Stat. at 2490. 
92 See H.R. Rep. No. 97-549, at 37, 44–46 (1982), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4320, 
4350, 4357–59. 
93 Congress added a preliminary review phase to the FMP review process in 1986, re-
quiring NMFS to make an immediate determination on the likelihood of approval for a 
council-submitted FMP. Act of Nov. 14, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-659, § 106(1)(C), 100 Stat. 
3706, 3712 (1986). In the same round of amendments, Congress also granted councils 
authority to comment on and demand a response concerning actions by federal and state 
agencies that could affect fish habitats, and mandated that NMFS cooperate with the 
councils on fishery research. Id. §§ 104(b)(2), 106(4), 100 Stat. at 3710, 3713. 
94 See Sustainable Fisheries Act, Pub. L. No. 104-297, §§ 108–110, 110 Stat. 3559, 3574–
92 (1996). 
95 For example, Representative Jolene Unsoeld placed these extended remarks in the 
Congressional Record in 1994: 
 Mr. Speaker, over the past 18 months our Fisheries Management Sub-
committee has held numerous oversight hearings on our Federal fisheries 
management system in anticipation of reauthorization of the [MSA]. Numer-
ous witnesses—representing every aspect of the Council management spec-
trum—testified before our committee. Nearly all suggested some type of re-
form was needed to restore the credibility of the decisions made by the 
Councils. Some suggested that allowing industry representatives to manage 
themselves creates a system rooted in conflicts of interests. An editorial in the 
Anchorage Daily News summed up this concern this way: “The Council sys-
tem is ethically bankrupt. We don’t let Exxon, ARCO, and BP run the Alaskan 
State Department of Environmental Conservation. We don’t put people from 
phone and electric companies in charge of the state public utilities commis-
sion. We shouldn’t turn federal fisheries over to fishermen whose decisions 
directly affect their personal fortunes.” 
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the MSA’s provisions governing council composition, member selec-
tion, and conflicts of interest.96 Although Congress also substantially 
streamlined the FMP review process, it by and large did not heed calls 
to centralize fishery management in NMFS.97 The amendments gave 
NMFS management authority over highly migratory fish in the Atlan-
tic,98 but otherwise the councils retained all of the policymaking au-
thority they had always enjoyed, and even gained additional protections 
against NMFS usurpation, again over executive branch objection.99 
Most notably, the amendments included provisions expressly giving 
councils authority to propose regulatory amendments100 and strictly 
limiting NMFS’s scope of review over all proposed regulations and 
amendments submitted by councils.101 
 Since Congress’s last MSA reauthorization and amendments in 
1996, calls to strip councils of their near-plenary policymaking authority 
have continued.102 Congress, however, has not changed its regional fish-
ery management philosophy, and congressional testimony from council 
members suggests that Congress could further improve the MSA to pre-
                                                                                                                      
140 Cong. Rec. 15,433, 15,433 (1994); see also Glenn Boledovich, Magnuson Fishery Conserva-
tion and Management Act: Congress Debates Amendments as Deadlines Approach for 1994 Reauthoriza-
tion, Ocean & Coastal L. Memo, Aug. 1994, available at http://oceanlaw.uoregon.edu/ 
memos/issue42.html (“Critics of the historical makeup of the regional councils suggest that 
fishing industry representatives have controlled policy, been shortsighted, and often lined 
their own pockets after being appointed to the regional councils and various advisory com-
mittees.”). 
96 Sustainable Fisheries Act, Pub. L. No. 104-297, § 107, 110 Stat. 3559, 3570–74 
(1996). 
97 See Boledovich, supra note 95 (“Such proposals have not gotten strong support, 
probably because the apparent intent of Congress in creating regional councils was to 
decentralize fishery management by giving regional councils (and the states that appoint 
the members) the primary role in designing FMPs.”). 
98 § 109(g), 110 Stat. at 3585–86. 
99 See Statement by President William J. Clinton on Signing S. 39, 32 Weekly Comp. 
Pres. Doc. 2040 (Oct. 11, 1996), as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4120, 4120–21. 
100 § 108(d), 110 Stat. at 3576. 
101 § 109(b), 110 Stat. at 3581–82. Also enacted with the 1996 amendments were provi-
sions preventing NMFS from repealing or revoking an FMP without three-quarters major-
ity approval from the involved council, and requiring NMFS to hold local hearings before 
adopting an FMP on its own. § 109(a), (i), 110 Stat. at 3582, 3587. 
102 See Eugene H. Buck & Daniel A. Waldeck, The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Con-
servation and Management Act: Reauthorization Issues 34–35 (Feb. 7, 2005), available 
at http://ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/05feb/RL30215.pdf; Pew Oceans Comm’n, 
America’s Living Oceans: Charting a Course for Sea Change 44–48 (2003), available at 
http://www.pewtrusts.com/pdf/env_pew_oceans_final_report.pdf. 
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vent NMFS from improperly interfering with the councils’ intended 
autonomy.103 
 The recent legislative and regulatory repartee among Congress, 
NMFS, and the North Pacific Fishery Management Council over Alaska’s 
crab fisheries illustrates how inconsistent the real-life council-NMFS re-
lationship is with the MSA. NMFS balked at its restricted role even after 
explicit congressional directive and congressional reinforcement of its 
limited role throughout the thirty-year history of the MSA. 
II. Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Crab Rationalization 
 Nothing in the MSA, of course, prevents Congress from using the 
councils and NMFS outside of the ordinary fishery management proc-
ess by mandating them to develop and implement specific manage-
ment measures, and that is exactly what Congress did in this case of the 
Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands (BSAI) crab fisheries rationalization.104 
After six years in development by the North Pacific Fishery Manage-
ment Council (North Pacific Council), Congress and President George 
W. Bush enacted an amendment to the MSA mandating “the Secretary 
shall approve and hereafter implement by regulation the Voluntary 
Three-Pie Cooperative Program for crab fisheries of the Bering Sea and 
Aleutian Islands approved by the North Pacific Council.”105 NMFS’s re-
sponse to this mandate—proposal of a regulation that differed substan-
tively and significantly from the program passed by the North Pacific 
Council—is pointed evidence that NMFS is unwilling to accept its lim-
ited role under the MSA.106 
                                                                                                                      
103 See Operations of the Regional Fishery Management Councils and the Reauthorization of the 
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation Act: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Resources, 109th 
Cong. (2005) (statement of Sean Martin, Vice Chair, Western Pacific Fishery Management 
Council), 2005 WL 2844860 (F.D.C.H.); Hearing on S. 2066 Before the Subcomm. on Oceans, 
Fisheries, and Coast Guard of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, & Transportation, 108th Cong. 
(2004) (statement of Stephanie Madsen, Chair, North Pacific Fishery Management Coun-
cil), 2004 WL 2067979 (F.D.C.H.). 
104 See Fisheries of the Exclusive Economic Zone Off Alaska; Allocating Bering Sea and 
Aleutian Islands King and Tanner Crab Fishery Resources, 69 Fed. Reg. 63,199, 63,200 
(proposed Oct. 29, 2004) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pts. 679, 680); Council Motion, supra 
note 25, at 1. 
105 16 U.S.C. § 1862(j)(1) (Supp. IV 2004). 
106 See Fisheries of the Exclusive Economic Zone Off Alaska; Allocating Bering Sea and 
Aleutian Islands King and Tanner Crab Fishery Resources, 69 Fed. Reg. at 63,200; see also 
discussion infra Part II.C. 
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A. Background 
 Shortly after a 1998 instruction from Congress to recommend 
management measures for BSAI crab fisheries off the coast of western 
Alaska,107 the North Pacific Council sponsored industry development of 
a policy to rationalize those fisheries.108 By May 2000, the industry 
committee had settled on a solution involving allocation of separate 
harvesting (fishing) and processing rights and explicit community pro-
tection elements.109 That fall, more than half of the BSAI crab fleet pe-
titioned Congress to pass emergency legislation that “authorizes the 
[North Pacific Council] to adopt by September 1, 2001, individual fish-
ing quotas (IFQs) for BSAI crab fishermen . . . and individual process-
ing quotas (IPQs) for BSAI crab processors.”110 Congress responded by 
instructing the North Pacific Council to “analyze individual fishing 
quotas, processor quotas, cooperatives, and quotas held by communi-
ties” and directing that “[t]he analysis should include an economic 
analysis of the impact of all options on communities and processors as 
well as the fishing fleets.”111 On June 10, 2002, the North Pacific Coun-
cil voted unanimously in favor of a so-called “three-pie voluntary coop-
                                                                                                                      
107 Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999, 
Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 211(c)(2)(B), 112 Stat. 2681, 2681–634 (1999). 
108 Following implementation of the American Fisheries Act (AFA) and the September 
8, 1999 announcement of severely depressed crab stocks, an ad hoc industry group met in 
Seattle on September 17, 1999, to discuss the possible application of AFA-cooperatives to 
rationalize crab fisheries. During the October 1999 North Pacific Council meeting, Rick 
Lauber (the Council Chairman) appointed two members as North Pacific Council liaisons 
to facilitate subsequent workshops and meetings. The ad hoc industry meetings were for-
malized under the North Pacific Council mantle on April 26, 2000 as the “Bering Sea Aleu-
tian Islands (BSAI) Crab Co-op Committee.” See generally Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 
Bearing Sea Aleutian Islands Crab Fisheries, Final Environmental Impact State-
ment, at app. 1-1 (Aug. 2004), available at www.fakr.noaa.gov/sustainablefisheries/crab/ 
eis/final/Appendix1_1.pdf (detailing the creation of the committee). 
109 Professor Matulich was invited by three harvester associations to present an indus-
try-wide seminar on May 11, 2000, at Lief Erikson Hall in Ballard, WA, regarding the eco-
nomics of “a two-pie allocation of [individual fishing quotas (IFQ)] and [individual proc-
essing quotas (IPQ)].” One week later (May 18, 2000), the BSAI Crab Co-op Committee 
abandoned cooperatives in favor of IFQs and IPQs, and also accepted the St. Paul region-
alization proposal. 
110 See Petition for Emergency Legislation (n.d.) (emphasis omitted) (on file with au-
thor). The initial 131 petitioners were subsequently joined by an additional twenty-four 
vessel owners. Letter from Brent Paine, Executive Dir., United Catcher Boats, to Sen. Slade 
Gorton (Sept. 25, 2000) (on file with author). 
111 Act of Dec. 21, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 144(b), 114 Stat. 2763A, 2763A-238 
(2000). 
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erative” approach to crab fishery rationalization112 that was designed to 
benefit crab harvesters, processors and fishery-dependent coastal 
communities—a win-win-win policy intent. Members of industry took 
the unanimous council policy recommendation, embodied in a motion 
by the council, to Congress for immediate legislation.113 
 In January 2004, Congress enacted legislation that explicitly in-
structed the Secretary of Commerce to implement the North Pacific 
Council’s motion through an amendment to the MSA: 
By not later than January 1, 2005, the Secretary shall approve 
and hereafter implement by regulation the Voluntary Three-
Pie Cooperative Program for crab fisheries of the Bering Sea 
and Aleutian Islands approved by the North Pacific Fishery 
Management Council between June 2002 and April 2003, and 
all trailing amendments including those reported to Congress 
on May 6, 2003.114 
Congress further stated that “[n]othing in this Chapter shall constitute 
a waiver, either express or implied, of the antitrust laws of the United 
States.”115 NMFS published a proposed rule for public comment on Oc-
tober 29, 2004,116 and it deviated substantially from the North Pacific 
Council’s motion and policy intent. 
B. Council Intent 
 Kevin Duffy, North Pacific Council member and then-Deputy 
Commissioner of the Alaska Department of Fish & Game, articulated the 
intent of the council’s motion when he introduced it to the full council: 
 Rationalization is the path to re-vitalize the economic health 
of [Alaska crab fisheries] . . . provided the policy recognizes 
this partnership among harvesters, processors and communi-
ties is like a three-legged stool. Cut out any leg and the stool 
tips over. 
                                                                                                                      
112 Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., Bearing Sea Aleutian Islands Crab Fisheries Fi-
nal Environmental Impact Statement, Executive Summary, at ES-4 (Aug. 2004), available 
at www.fakr.noaa.gov/sustainablefisheries/crab/eis/final/ExecSummary.pdf [hereinafter 
NMFS, Executive Summary]; see Council Motion, supra note 25, at 1. 
113 See 16 U.S.C. § 1862(j)(1) (Supp. IV 2004). 
114 Id. 
115 Id. § 1862(j)(6). 
116 Fisheries of the Exclusive Economic Zone Off Alaska; Allocating Bering Sea and 
Aleutian Islands King and Tanner Crab Fishery Resources, 69 Fed. Reg. 63,199, 63,200 
(proposed Oct. 29, 2004) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pts. 679, 680). 
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 The solution is to ensure that any rationalization program 
maintains the integrity of this partnership by providing an in-
centive for all parties to work toward a mutually beneficial 
goal . . . . This motion advances a voluntary three-pie coopera-
tive, designed to recognize the prior economic interests and 
importance of the partnership . . . . The plan . . . addresses 
conservation and management issues associated with the 
open access fishery . . . . It includes mechanisms to reduce the 
excess harvesting and processing capacities of the industry. It 
increases economic returns and hence, stability for harvesters, 
processors and communities. It enhances efficiencies by en-
couraging voluntary industry cooperation, because each of 
the three partners looks beyond simple self-interest to the 
synergistic benefits of mutual interests.117 
 The integrated motion comprises several key elements: quota 
share allocations to harvesters and processors, regional landing and 
processing requirements, voluntary cooperative formation, a binding 
arbitration system (BA), and community protection measures such as 
community development quota (CDQ).118 The initial allocation of har-
vester quota shares (QS)—in the form of individual fishing quotas 
(IFQ)—and processor quota share (PQS)—in the form of individual 
processing quotas (IPQ)—represents an exclusive but revocable privi-
lege to harvest or process a history-based percentage of the total allow-
able catch for each fishery.119 Fully transferable IFQ is allocated annu-
ally and designated by north or south landing region, and as Class A or 
Class B quota.120 Class A IFQ (ninety percent of the catch history) re-
quires delivery to processors holding uncommitted IPQ in the desig-
nated region.121 Class B IFQ (ten percent of the catch history) has no 
delivery requirement.122 This unbalanced quota allocation between sec-
tors was fiercely negotiated and intended to give harvesters ex-vessel 
                                                                                                                      
117 Audio tape: Kevin Duffy, Deputy Commissioner, Alaska Department of Fish & Game, 
Statement for the Record After Making the Council Motion ( June 8, 2002) (North Pacific 
Fisheries Management Council) [hereinafter Duffy Speech]; see Bering Sea/Aleutian Island 
Crab Rationalization Plan: Hearing on S.R. 253 Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, & Trans-
portation, 108th Cong. (2003) (testimony of Kevin Duffy, Commissioner, Alaska Department 
of Fish & Game), available at http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=768& 
wit_id=2107. 
118 See Council Motion, supra note 25, at 2–5, 6, 11, 18–20; Duffy Speech, supra note 117. 
119 See Council Motion, supra note 25, at 1–3. 
120 See id. at 2. 
121 See id. 
122 Id. 
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price negotiating leverage over processors, while allowing both sectors 
and fishery-dependent communities to benefit from rationalization.123 
Use caps are imposed to prevent excessive consolidation of QS and 
PQS.124 
 To assure broad distribution of rationalization benefits across har-
vesters, processors and communities, the North Pacific Council envi-
sioned two types of cooperatives: (1) price bargaining cooperatives, 
which seek limited antitrust exemption under the Fishermen’s Collec-
tive Marketing Act (FCMA);125 and (2) operational cooperatives, which 
seek no limited antitrust exemption but are intended to improve op-
erational efficiencies across multiple species, multiple harvesters and 
even multiple processors.126 
 BA is included in the North Pacific Council’s motion, at the insis-
tence of harvesters.127 BA is conceived as a voluntary framework of last 
resort to resolve any outstanding price and/or delivery disputes be-
tween harvesters and processors.128 The BA process is built on distinct, 
independent arbitrations, so as to prevent behavior that could violate 
antitrust laws.129 
 Community protection is vital to the State of Alaska and arises in 
three elements of the North Pacific Council’s motion.130 It was apparent 
to everyone involved that fishery-dependent communities on the door-
step of the historically largest license-limited access crab fishery (the 
opilio snow crab fishery) would be rendered inefficient and redundant 
under rationalization.131 Yet, these are communities with a single eco-
                                                                                                                      
123 See Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., Bering Sea Aleutian Islands Crab Fisheries 
Final Environmental Impact Statement 4-147, 4-162 (Aug. 2004), available at www.fakr. 
noaa.gov/sustainablefisheries/crab/eis/final/Chapter4.pdf [hereinafter NMFS, ch. 4]; 
NMFS, Executive Summary, supra note 112, at 4. 
124 See Council Motion, supra note 25, at 23–24. 
125 15 U.S.C. § 521 (2000). 
126 See Council Motion, supra note 25, at 20; Letter from David Bedford, Deputy Comm’r, 
Alaska Dep’t of Fish & Game, to Sue Salveson, Assistant Reg’l Adm’r, Alaska Region, Nat’l 
Marine Fisheries Serv. 2 (Dec. 12, 2004) (on file with author) [hereinafter Dec. 12 Bedford 
Letter]. See generally Mark Fina, Rationalization of the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Crab Fisher-
ies, 29 Marine Pol’y 311, 315–16 (2005) (describing the benefits of processor-associated 
cooperatives). 
127 See Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., Bering Sea Aleutian Islands Crab Fisheries 
Final Environmental Impact Statement app. 1, at 397 (Aug. 2004), available at www. 
fakr.noaa.gov/sustainablefisheries/crab/eis/final/Appendix1_RIR.pdf [hereinafter NMFS, 
app. 1]. 
128 See id.; Council Motion, supra note 25, at 12–13. 
129 See Council Motion, supra note 25, at 12–13. 
130 See id. at 15–16. 
131 See Duffy Speech, supra note 117. 
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nomic base, dependent almost exclusively on crab processing.132 For 
example, the Pribilof Islands communities of St. George and, more im-
portantly, St. Paul, are located in the middle of the Bering Sea, adjacent 
to the principal opilio fishing grounds.133 Approximately forty percent 
of the opilio crab are landed in these two island communities.134 Proces-
sors located there because it was an efficient location under license-
limited access derby conditions.135 By eliminating the race-for-fish and 
the consequential race-to-process, the license-limited access location ad-
vantage would be lost to more distant ports like Dutch Harbor, threaten-
ing community viability.136 Variable processing costs are much lower in 
Dutch Harbor and Akutan, more than offsetting the $0.10 per pound 
cost of a roundtrip from the fishing grounds.137 
 The first element of community protection is to mirror historic 
north-south landings by tagging IFQ and IPQ with regional designa-
tions138 for the purpose of protecting the only two northern communi-
ties: St. George and St. Paul.139 The second element allocates ten per-
cent of all QS to eligible Alaska-native CDQ communities as community 
development quota.140 In so doing, it encourages investment in vessels. 
The third element encourages communities to maintain their PQS, in 
the event a processor wishes to leave.141 A right of first refusal is given to 
the community to purchase PQS that arose in that community.142 For 
those communities where a CDQ group exists, the CDQ group is given 
the right of first refusal; otherwise a governmental entity is given the 
entitlement.143 
                                                                                                                      
132 See Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., Bearing Sea Aleutian Islands Crab Fisheries 
Final Environmental Impact Statement app. 3, at 11 (Aug. 2004), available at www.fakr. 
noaa.gov/sustainablefisheries/crab/eis/final/Appendix3.pdf [hereinafter NMFS, app. 3]. 
133 See id. at 151. 
134 See NMFS, app. 1, supra note 127, at 362 tbl.3.6-1. 
135 See id. at 39. 
136 See Letter from David Benton, Chairman, N. Pac. Fishery Mgmt. Council, to Con-
gress (Aug. 5, 2002) [hereinafter Aug. 5 Benton Letter]. Regionalization was based on 
avoiding adverse community impacts by protecting historical landings. See id. There are 
only two communities in the northern region—St. Paul and St. George. See NMFS, app. 3, 
supra note 132, at 17–21. The north/south region designation was designed primarily to 
benefit the Pribilofs Islands, of which St. Paul is the largest. See NMFS, app. 3, supra note 
132, at 156. 
137 See NMFS, ch. 4, supra note 123, at 4-167 to 4-169. 
138 See Council Motion, supra note 25, at 2. 
139 See NMFS, app. 3, supra note 132, at 17–21. 
140 See Council Motion, supra note 25, at 18–19. 
141 See id. at 16–18. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 16–17. 
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C. North Pacific Council’s Motion Versus NMFS Proposed Rule 
 After NMFS published its proposed rule in October 2004,144 the 
North Pacific Council, in a rare action, conducted a very thorough re-
view of the proposed rule.145 An extensive review was deemed necessary 
by the State of Alaska and a broad cross-section of industry, after con-
cern arose that the NMFS’s proposed rule might undermine the policy 
embodied in the North Pacific Council’s motion.146 In particular, there 
was concern that the proposed rule would vitiate the intended purpose 
of PQS.147 The North Pacific Council staff, the State of Alaska, and 
members of the public contributed extensive comments.148 This subsec-
tion addresses the four most important and fundamental inconsisten-
cies between the proposed rule and the North Pacific Council mo-
tion—those that would impair the North Pacific Council’s win-win-win 
intent.149 These four issues were identified in comments prepared by 
the authors and directly incorporated into the State of Alaska’s com-
ments to the NMFS.150 Similar comments from three associations are 
included: the North Pacific Crab Association, an association of crab 
processors; the Central Bering Sea Fishermen’s Association, a CDQ 
group from St. Paul; and the Alaska Crab Coalition, the oldest associa-
                                                                                                                      
144 Fisheries of the Exclusive Economic Zone Off Alaska; Allocating Bering Sea and 
Aleutian Islands King and Tanner Crab Fishery Resources, 69 Fed. Reg. 63,199, 63,200 
(proposed Oct. 29, 2004) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pts. 679, 680). 
145 See Dec. 12 Bedford Letter, supra note 126, at 1. 
146 See id. Kevin Duffy, Deputy Commissioner of the Alaska Department of Fish & 
Game, directed Scott Matulich to conduct a comprehensive review of the proposed rule on 
September 9, 2004. 
147 Id. 
148 Fisheries of the Exclusive Economic Zone Off Alaska; Allocating Bering Sea and 
Aleutian Islands King and Tanner Crab Fishery Resources, 70 Fed. Reg. 10,174, 10,174 
(Mar. 2, 2005) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 902 and 50 C.F.R. pts. 679, 680). NMFS re-
ceived forty-nine letters of public comment on the proposed rule. Id. Those letters were 
summarized into 234 distinct comments that NMFS responded to in the preamble to the 
final rule. See id. at 10,179–226. 
149 Dec. 12 Bedford Letter, supra note 126, at 1. 
150 See id. 
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tion of North Pacific crab harvesters.151 Each of the three groups did 
not comment on all four issues.152 The four central issues are: 
• The definition, and limited scope, of cooperatives; 
• the incorrect application of the affiliation standard, particularly 
as it pertains to B-shares; 
• potential antitrust and anti-competitiveness issues related to the 
design of binding arbitration and sharing of data and other in-
formation; and 
• a flaw in the right of first refusal design. 
1. Cooperatives 
 The proposed rule took a conservative, zero-risk approach to anti-
trust that was inconsistent with council intent.153 In so doing, the pro-
posed rule defined the entire universe of cooperatives as only program-
compliant FCMA (bargaining) cooperatives that need limited antitrust 
exemption.154 For example, “[a] crab harvesting cooperative is a group 
of crab QS holders who have chosen to form a cooperative under the 
1934 Fisherman’s Collective Marketing Act (15 U.S.C. 521) in order to 
combine and collectively manage their crab IFQ through a crab coop-
erative IFQ permit issued by NMFS.”155 
 Yet, the North Pacific Council also envisioned non-FCMA opera-
tional cooperatives comprised of non-processor affiliated vessels, proces-
sor-affiliated vessels and one or more processors.156 Both cooperative 
structures were envisioned as essential “to maximize operational effi-
ciencies and net national benefits, and to broadly distribute those ra-
tionalization benefits across harvesters, processors and fishery-depend-
                                                                                                                      
151 See Letter from the Cent. Bering Sea Fishermen’s Ass’n, to Sue Salveson, Assistant 
Reg’l Adm’r, Alaska Region, Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv. (Dec. 13, 2004) (on file with au-
thor) [hereinafter Dec. 13 CBFSA Letter]; Letter from John Iani, Executive Dir., N. Pac. 
Crab Ass’n, to Sue Salveson, Assistant Reg’l Adm’r, Alaska Region, Nat’l Marine Fisheries 
Serv. (Dec. 13, 2004) (on file with author) [hereinafter Dec. 13 Iani Letter]; Letter from 
Arni Thomson, Executive Dir., Alaska Crab Coal., to Sue Salveson, Assistant Reg’l Adm’r, 
Alaska Region, Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv. (Dec. 9, 2004) (on file with author) [hereinaf-
ter Dec. 9 Thomson Letter]. See generally Madsen Letter, supra note 25. 
152 See Dec. 13 CBSFA Letter, supra note 151; Dec. 13 Iani Letter, supra note 151; Dec. 9 
Thomson Letter, supra note 151. 
153 Dec. 12 Bedford Letter, supra note 126. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. (quoting Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands Crab Fishery Resources, 69 Fed. Reg. 
63,199, 63,286 (proposed Oct. 29, 2004) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pts. 679, 680)). 
156 Id. 
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ent Alaska coastal communities—the centerpiece of the motion.”157 
“Cooperatives may be formed through contractual agreements among 
fishermen who wish to join into a cooperative associated with one or 
more processors . . . .”158 Non-FCMA operational cooperatives need no 
limited antitrust exemption because they involve neither market seg-
mentation nor price formation and they pose no significant anti-
competitiveness risk of violating antitrust laws of the United States.159 
The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and National Oceanic and At-
mospheric Administration (NOAA) general counsel ruled that vertically 
integrated factory trawlers in the Pacific Whiting fishery are allowed to 
form a non-FCMA cooperative for the purpose of improving operational 
efficiency.160 The Pacific Whiting Cooperative only needed to file a 
Business Review letter with DOJ.161 American Fisheries Act (AFA) coop-
eratives were similarly justified; section 210(b) of the AFA permitted 
processor-affiliated vessels to participate in AFA-authorized fishery co-
operatives.162 The justification in both contexts is identical to that of 
North Pacific crab rationalization—improving operational efficiency.163 
 NOAA general counsel received numerous complaints that its nar-
row interpretation that all crab cooperatives must be limited antitrust-
exempt cooperatives under the FCMA was untenable and fundamen-
tally undermined the North Pacific Council’s intent.164 Nearly one 
month after the proposed rule was released to the public and just nine 
days prior to the end of the public comment period, NOAA general 
counsel for the Alaska Region released an opinion that non-FCMA co-
operatives intended by the North Pacific Council motion were not ille-
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158 Council Motion, supra note 25, at 20. 
159 See Dec. 12 Bedford Letter, supra note 126; see also Randolph D. Moss, Participation 
by Processor-Owned Catcher Vessels in Inshore Cooperatives Under the American 
Fisheries Act of 1998: Memorandum of Opinion for the General Counsel Depart-
ment of Commerce (1999), available at http//usdoj.gov/olc/pollockopinionfinal.htm. 
160 See Joseph M. Sullivan, Harvesting Cooperatives and U.S. Antitrust Law: Re-
cent Developments and Implications 8 ( Jul. 10, 2000), available at http://oregonstate. 
edu/dept/IIFET/2000/papers/sullivan.pdf. 
161 See id. 
162 See American Fisheries Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 210(b), 112 Stat. 2681-621, 2681-
629 (1998). 
163 See Fisheries of the Exclusive Economic Zone Off Alaska: Allocating Bering Sea and 
Aleutian Island King and Tanner Crab Fishery Resources, 70 Fed. Reg. 10,174, 10,174 
(Mar. 2, 2005) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. pt. 902 and 50 C.F.R. pts. 679, 680). 
164 Id.; Memorandum from Lisa L. Lindeman, Reg’l Council, Alaska Region, Nat’l Oce-
anic and Atmospheric Admin., to James W. Balsiger, Adm’r, Alaska Region, Nat’l Marine 
Fisheries Serv. (Dec. 3, 2004) (on file with author) [hereinafter Lindeman Memorandum]. 
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gal.165 Thus, their exclusion could not be justified as necessary to en-
sure that the program proposed by the council complied with relevant 
laws.166 Unequal application of the law in the whiting and crab contexts 
was even more egregious.167 Market segmentation in the form of crab 
IFQ and IPQ occurred by statute in the North Pacific crab rationaliza-
tion.168 Market segmentation in the Pacific Whiting Cooperative— issu-
ance of IFQ to vertically integrated factory trawlers—was conditional 
on the formation of a non-FCMA cooperative and subject only to filing 
a Business Review letter with DOJ.169 
 The North Pacific Crab Association raised a related concern with 
the proposed rule’s description of cooperatives: 
The proposed regulation limits a holder of QS from joining 
more than one crab-harvesting cooperative. ([§] 680.21(b)(4) 
and (5)). Instead the holder of QS must either join only one 
cooperative or not participate at all in cooperative operation. 
We believe this is inconsistent with Council intent and will 
greatly hinder the ability to achieve the maximum operational 
efficiencies available to harvesting cooperatives. All of the ves-
sels receiving QS will receive differing amounts of species and 
regional designations. The limitation to only a single coopera-
tive will require a high number of intercooperative transfers 
to match up species and regional designations with appropri-
ate locations of PQS holders. This will significantly add to the 
burden of managing these transfers.170 
The Alaska Crab Coalition offered a similar comment: 
There is no evidence of intent on the part of the Council that 
a QS holder be prohibited from simultaneous membership in 
more than one cooperative. Restricting flexibility to transfers 
among coops would not be as efficient as also allowing QS 
holders to join more than one coop . . . . 
 . . . The final regulations should allow QS holders to be 
members, simultaneously, of different coops in different fish-
eries or in the same fisheries, and of different kinds of coops 
                                                                                                                      
165 Lindeman Memorandum, supra note 164. 
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167 See Dec. 12 Bedford Letter, supra note 126. 
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169 See Sullivan, supra note 160, at 5. 
170 Dec. 13 Iani Letter, supra note 151. 
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(FCMA and non-FCMA), in order to maximize economic effi-
ciency and achieve other benefits.171 
 Prohibiting non-FCMA cooperative formation would have under-
mined the North Pacific Council’s explicit intent to benefit harvesters, 
processors and fishery-dependent communities.172 Any holder of IPQ or 
any harvester affiliated with an IPQ holder would be prohibited from 
participating in operational cooperatives, thereby denying roughly half 
of the BSAI crab industry the safety and operational efficiencies that 
voluntary non-FCMA cooperatives provide.173 
2. Affiliation 
 Affiliation with a processor became the source of enormous confu-
sion, in part because the North Pacific Council motion used a context-
specific definition.174 Affiliation with a processor was defined according 
to a ten percent ownership standard in the context of QS leasing,175 
ownership caps,176 and price bargaining and binding arbitration.177 
 However, the motion applied a different, less determinate stan-
dard to define “processor affiliation” in the context of who is to be de-
nied the more valuable B-shares: 
Independent (non-affiliated) harvesters will receive class B 
IFQ pro rata, such that the full class B QS percentage is allo-
cated to them in the aggregate. “Affiliation” will be deter-
mined based on an annual affidavit submitted by each QS 
holder. A person will be considered affiliated, if an IPQ processor 
controls delivery of a QS holder’s IFQ.178 
The council adopted a control-of-delivery standard, not ten percent 
ownership, in this context presumably because the purpose of B-shares 
was to provide harvesters ex-vessel price leverage through the ability to 
move fish to a higher price offer.179 
                                                                                                                      
171 Dec. 9 Thomson Letter, supra note 151, at 4. 
172 Dec. 12 Bedford Letter, supra note 126. 
173 Dec. 9 Thomson Letter, supra note 151, at 2. 
174 Dec. 13 CBSFA Letter, supra note 151. 
175 Council Motion, supra note 25, at 5. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. at 11. 
178 Id. at 5 (emphasis added). 
179 See Madsen Letter, supra note 25, at 12. 
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 NMFS’s proposed rule, however, provided a single, ten percent 
ownership definition of processor affiliation, rather than following the 
council’s context-specific intent: 
Affiliation means a relationship between two or more entities in 
which one directly or indirectly owns or controls a 10-percent 
or greater interest in, or otherwise controls another, or a third 
entity directly or indirectly owns or controls a 10-percent or 
greater interest in, or otherwise controls both.180 
Thus, the proposed rule failed to ensure broad distribution of ration-
alization benefits.181 
 Applying the ten percent ownership standard across the board 
would have several unintended, adverse effects.182 First, it would deny 
crew on processor-affiliated vessels a share of the greatest possible B-
share price, or alternatively it would cause vertically owned vessels to 
become less competitive.183 Vertically owned vessels would be obliged to 
offer higher crew shares in order to mitigate lost crew payments.184 
Second, processor-affiliated vessels would have every incentive to 
maximize rents by releasing control of B-share deliveries to the skipper, 
and the skipper would have the incentive to seek the highest possible B-
share price.185 Only one other instance of “affiliation” can be found in 
the motion.186 A ten percent ownership standard (with a harvester) was 
used to clarify the rules on cooperative formation.187 
 Each of the three industry associations had similar comments on 
this point. The Alaska Crab Coalition, for example, highlighted how 
the proposed rule’s ten percent affiliation standard needed to change 
to conform to the motion’s intent: 
The Proposed Rule should allow for affiliated QS holders to 
participate in non-FCMA “operational cooperatives” for pur-
poses of economic efficiency, but affiliated QS holders should 
                                                                                                                      
180 Fisheries of the Exclusive Economic Zone Off Alaska; Allocating Bering Sea and 
Aleutian Islands King and Tanner Crab Fishery Resources, 69 Fed. Reg. 63,199, 63,261 
(proposed Oct. 29, 2004) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pts. 679, 680) (emphasis omitted). 
181 Dec. 12 Bedford Letter, supra note 126, at 3. 
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183 See id. 
184 See id. 
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187 Id. at 26. 
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be prohibited from participation in price formation negotia-
tions.188 
This association of harvesters also noted: 
An affidavit requirement [should be] set forth in the Pro-
posed Rule as a criterion for the issuance of B shares, as speci-
fied in the Council motion (at 1.6.4) and is an important 
element of accountability and enforceability of the system de-
vised by the Council, and should be preserved.189 
 Communities echoed the comments by the Alaska Crab Coalition. 
CDQ communities, in particular, saw the narrow affiliation interpreta-
tion as an explicit denial of program benefits intended for CDQ 
groups.190 
3. Binding Arbitration 
 Fleetwide arbitration was considered and rejected by the North 
Pacific Council in favor of a “last best offer” system built on distinct, 
independent arbitrations.191 Yet, NMFS’s proposed rule allowed a bind-
ing arbitration (BA) system that mirrors fleetwide arbitration, thereby 
violating council intent concerning the sharing of confidential data.192 
The motion unambiguously stated: 
Subject to limitations of antitrust laws and the need for pro-
prietary confidentiality, all parties to an arbitration shall have 
access only to information provided to the arbitrator(s) or 
panel for that arbitration directly by the parties to that arbitra-
tion.193 
And the motion also stated: 
Data collected in the data collection program may be used to 
verify the accuracy of data provided to the arbitrator(s) in an 
arbitration proceeding. . . . Any data verification will be un-
                                                                                                                      
188 Dec. 9 Thomson Letter, supra note 151, at 2. 
189 Id. at 2–3. 
190 See infra Part II.C.4. 
191 See Council Motion, supra note 25 at 13–15. 
192 See Fisheries of the Exclusive Economic Zone Off Alaska; Allocating Bering Sea and 
Aleutian Islands King and Tanner Crab Fishery Resources, 69 Fed. Reg. 63,199, 63,203 
(proposed Oct. 29, 2004) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pts. 679, 680). 
193 Council Motion, supra note 25, at 12. 
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dertaken only if the confidentiality protections of the data col-
lection program will not be compromised.194 
 Yet sharing of BA data was manifest in the proposed rule.195 For 
example, the contract arbitrator was allowed to share information with 
parties other than those engaged in the BA, violating the North Pacific 
Council’s unambiguous confidentiality requirements.196 In fact, the 
proposed rule required the contract arbitrator to provide NMFS with: 
[a] copy of any information, data, or documents given by the 
Contract Arbitrator to any person who is not a party to the 
particular arbitration for which that information was pro-
vided. The Contract Arbitrator must identify the arbitration to 
which those information, data, or documents apply, and the 
person to whom those information, data, or documents were 
provided.197 
 Furthermore, the proposed rule provided that the contract arbi-
trator “must receive and consider all data submitted by the parties,” in-
cluding data that are not germane to the bilateral dispute.198 This re-
quirement provided compelling economic incentive for harvesters to 
structure a fleet-wide system of mandatory binding arbitration in order 
to capture cost of production data from all processors.199 The North 
Pacific Crab Association commented, “Although an FCMA cooperative 
is allowed under the antitrust laws to negotiate prices collectively, the 
FCMA does not condone all activity that might otherwise be in viola-
tion of the antitrust statutes.”200 Fleetwide arbitration posed serious an-
titrust and anti-competitiveness risks and clearly violated the North Pa-
cific Council’s intent that binding arbitration was the last resort “to re-
solve failed price negotiations.”201 
 In sum, the proposed rule allowed and promoted: (1) fleetwide 
BA that was rejected by the Council; (2) sharing of proprietary and 
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195 See Fisheries of the Exclusive Economic Zone Off Alaska; Allocating Bering Sea and 
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196 Id. at 63,203. 
197 Id. at 63,285. 
198 See id. 
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200 Dec. 13 Iani Letter, supra note 151, at 8. 
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Atmospheric Admin. (Aug. 27, 2003) (on file with author) [hereinafter Aug. 27 Pate Let-
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confidential data that posed serious antitrust and anti-competitiveness 
risks; and (3) dispute resolution between two parties based on informa-
tion regarding disputes between other parties.202 
 
4. Community Protection 
 
 The North Pacific Council motion gave CDQ communities explicit 
protections in the form of both CDQs203 and the right of first refusal.204 
The first encouraged investment in the harvesting sector,205 and the 
second encouraged retention of community-based processing.206 How-
ever, the narrow, ten percent ownership standard of “affiliation” in the 
proposed rule deprived the dual community protection benefits in-
tended by the North Pacific Council.207 As the Central Bering Sea Fish-
ermen’s Association commented: 
It was the Councils [sic] intent to allow CDQ groups the abil-
ity to purchase both harvest[ing] assets and—as a [form] of 
community protection—to enter into Rights of First Refusal 
(ROFRs) for processor quota that originated in our commu-
nities.208 
Thus, the proposed rule created a Gordian knot: if any CDQ commu-
nity were to exercise the right of first refusal, it could do so only by de-
valuing its CDQ crab harvesting quota; exercising its ROFR would ren-
der the CDQ group affiliated, requiring it to give up the more valuable 
B-shares, in exchange for A-shares.209 
III. NMFS Failure to Respect MSA’s Devolution Policy 
 Complex policies, like the North Pacific Fishery Management 
Council’s (North Pacific Council) crab rationalization motion, often 
                                                                                                                      
202 See Fisheries of the Exclusive Economic Zone Off Alaska; Allocating Bering Sea and 
Aleutian Islands King and Tanner Crab Fishery Resources, 69 Fed. Reg. at 63,199, 63,203, 
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sistant Reg’l Adm’r, Alaska Region, Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv. (Dec. 13, 2004) (on file 
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create unintentional ambiguity. This ambiguity leaves the regulatory 
agency with the job of ferreting out policy intent and drafting regula-
tions to advance intent, while conforming to federal laws. Some minor 
inconsistencies will naturally arise due to these ambiguities. The role of 
public debate is to help formulate policy intent and policy detail; public 
comment on the proposed rule—among other things—helps assure 
congruence between policy intent and regulations. 
 In one sense, the process appears to work. Following public com-
ment and the uncharacteristically detailed North Pacific Council re-
view, National Marine Fisheries Service’s (NMFS) final rule210 em-
braced all but one of the major concerns raised above, along with 
countless lesser concerns. Yet, in another sense, the fact that the pro-
posed rule deviated so fundamentally from the North Pacific Council’s 
motion, despite Congress’s unambiguous direction to implement the 
motion, raises a serious question about administrative process. The re-
view conducted by the North Pacific Council, the State of Alaska, and 
members of industry was unprecedented. It was done because the pro-
posed rule deviated in fundamental ways from specific council policy 
intent. 
 It would appear that National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admini-
stration (NOAA) and Department of Justice (DOJ) attorneys over-
stepped their limited policy implementation responsibilities and in-
serted themselves as policymakers. Nothing in the North Pacific Coun-
cil’s motion could be construed as limiting cooperatives to only Fish-
ermen’s Collective Marketing Act (FCMA) cooperatives. Nothing in the 
motion could be construed as limiting B-shares only to those vessels 
having no more than ten percent ownership affiliation with a proces-
sor.211 Nothing in the motion could be construed as requiring manda-
tory, fleetwide binding arbitration or as providing anything less than 
strict confidentiality of cost data. Nothing in the motion could be con-
strued as depriving community development quota (CDQ) groups the 
dual community protection benefits of quota ownership, including B-
                                                                                                                      
210 Fisheries of the Exclusive Economic Zone Off Alaska; Allocating Bering Sea and 
Aleutian Island King and Tanner Crab Fishery Resources, 70 Fed. Reg. 10,174, 10,174 
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shares, and the ability to retain community-based processing. And noth-
ing in the motion was determined by NOAA General Counsel to be in 
violation of federal law. 
 Yet, each of the four major instances in which the proposed rule 
deviated from the motion potentially undermined the North Pacific 
Council’s win-win-win policy intent. This potential effect should have 
been obvious to NMFS. In particular, the deviations undermined the 
North Pacific Council’s intent of broadening the distribution of ration-
alization benefits through the use of transferable processing quota 
where the North Pacific Council had found no other vehicle to accom-
plish this distributional goal. The proposed rule denied rationalization 
benefits to processing quota holders and processor affiliates. Without 
the ability to protect and benefit all stakeholders, rationalization could 
not proceed. 
 In a pointed letter to NOAA Administrator Conrad Lautenbacher 
sent the day the public comment period closed, Senator Ted Stevens 
expressly concluded that NMFS overstepped its straightforward policy 
implementation responsibility by failing to implement the Council’s 
motion: 
It has been brought to my attention that the proposed regula-
tions published by NMFS deviates substantially from the pro-
gram crafted by the North Pacific [Fishery Management] 
Council . . . . I specifically referenced the North Pacific Coun-
cil’s program in the law and directed NMFS to implement “all 
parts of the Program.” It was the North Pacific Council that 
had the expertise to develop such a comprehensive rationali-
zation program and the regulations should closely reflect their 
intent and purpose.212 
 It is not surprising that NOAA General Counsel or DOJ raised 
concerns over the innovative use of processing quota213—Congress had 
singled out antitrust concerns when it stated that “[n]othing in this Act 
shall constitute a waiver, either express or implied, of the antitrust laws 
of the United States.”214 A zero-risk approach, however, was not neces-
sary to comply with this admonition, and is an extraordinary applica-
tion of antitrust law.215 
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 Ignoring or changing policy intent outside of the council process, 
however, raises the obvious question: who has authority to make federal 
fishery policy? The MSA and its legislative history make it clear that 
Congress has not intended—except in extraordinary circumstances— 
for NMFS to change unilaterally the management tacks set by the re-
gional management councils.216 This is especially true, as in the Bering 
Sea and Aleutian Islands (BSAI) crab rationalization case, when Con-
gress and the President explicitly direct NMFS to implement particular, 
council-developed policies. Moreover, policy revision by NMFS after 
council deliberation undermines the public participation components 
of the regional council process and the Administrative Procedure Act, 
exposing NMFS and the Secretary of Commerce to a risk of litigation.217 
 The complexity of the real life of federal administrative agencies 
makes it difficult to determine why NMFS has not respected the MSA’s 
devolution philosophy. We wonder, however, whether the regional coun-
cils are so unique that NMFS is unwilling to accept the concept of policy 
formulation occurring outside of Washington, D.C. Regardless, it seems 
that the agency is having a hard time adjusting to its limited role.218 Rep-
resentative Gerry Studds, primary sponsor of the original MSA in 1976, 
articulated this suspicion during Congress’s first round of oversight hear-
ings on the new regional councils: 
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[I]t seems to me the inevitable is happening, given the institu-
tional makeup of this city, this Government, which is to say, 
“Well, nobody’s looking, let’s just creep out there and get a 
hold of this one and that one and bring them all back in here 
and make it fit.” And we are going to end up . . . with a nice 
convenient, conventional pattern of people working for the 
Department of Commerce, or whatever its name is, at any 
given time. 
 That is not what we intended in the Congress. And I think 
that from time to time it has been necessary for the councils 
particularly, and some members of this committee, to point 
out to the National Marine Fisheries Services . . . that in our 
judgment you have strayed from time to time or somehow lost 
sight of the overriding intention of this committee and of the 
Congress . . . to do something new under the Sun. We did not 
intend to establish yet another set of traditional bureaucratic 
procedures. 
  . . . [T]here is an innate, given the nature of the beast of 
this Government in Washington . . . almost unconscious, irre-
sistible urge to reach out and pull back in and regular-
ize . . . and to make these creatures recognizable and conven-
tional and just nice, the way everything is supposed to fit in lit-
tle boxes around here. They do not. The act was not written 
that way . . . .219 
Even if, as is likely, the problem is not so straightforward, legislative ad-
justments that seek to focus NMFS’s attention on the councils’ policy 
intentions could go a long way toward alleviating longstanding legal 
tension in the council-NMFS relationship. 
Recommendation and Conclusion 
 This tension, between policy formulation and policy implementa-
tion, challenges the very core of the MSA: devolution of policymaking 
to regional fishery management councils. That core MSA principle 
might be better served if all proposed rules were required to begin with 
a general statement of council intent underlying the motions. Then, an 
explanation of how each element of the proposed rule implements the 
                                                                                                                      
219 Fishery Conservation and Management Act: Hearings Before Subcomm. on Fisheries and 
Wildlife Conservation and the Environment of the H. Comm. On Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 
96th Cong. 448–51 (1979) (statement of Rep. Gerry Studs). 
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element-specific council intent should occur in the proposed rule pre-
amble. Such a requirement would also serve to lessen the government’s 
exposure to potential litigation. 
 Currently, the MSA does not require NMFS to publish a compari-
son of proposed rules and associated policies—it only requires explana-
tions of any differences between the proposed and final regulations 
that it publishes.220 Even though an explanation of policy changes 
would only appear in the preamble, this simple addition might remind 
NMFS that Congress has not empowered it to change council policies 
and help the councils and public participants identify unauthorized 
revisions. But the recommendation is a double-edged sword—councils 
should also be required to clearly articulate both broad policy intent 
and element-specific intent.221 
 Ambiguity is never likely to disappear from complicated policies, 
such as crab rationalization. But there should be little reason for such 
conflict between policy formulation and policy implementation. 
                                                                                                                      
220 16 U.S.C. § 1854(b)(3) (2000). 
221 This requirement should be added to the Councils’ existing obligation to keep de-
tailed records of their proceedings. See 16 U.S.C. § 1852(i)(2)(E) (“Detailed minutes of 
each meeting of the Council, except for any closed session, shall be kept and shall contain 
a record of the persons present, a complete and accurate description of matters discussed 
and conclusions reached, and copies of all statements filed.”). 
